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PRECEDENT IN LA w. Edited by Laurence Goldstein. New York: Ox-
ford University Press. 1987. Pp. xvi, 279. $42. 
In Precedent in Law, Laurence Goldstein 1 has assembled a collec-
tion of essays dealing with the fundamental and pervasive phenome-
non of precedent. 2 Although not formally divided into sections, the 
essays fall into three basic categories: (1) essays providing an histori-
cal overview of the approaches to precedent; (2) essays concerning the-
ories of binding precedent; and (3) essays on the less fundamental 
(though still very important) issue of how one actually reasons from 
prior cases, assuming that some version of the practice of precedent 
can be justified. 
Goldstein's purpose in bringing together the works of the eight 
contributing scholars3 was "to produce a collection of essays that may 
be read with pleasure and profit by students, practitioners and, indeed, 
by anyone with an interest in the workings of the law" (p. vi). By thus 
limiting his goals, Goldstein easily achieves them; yet he also limits 
Precedent in Law's usefulness to the scholar. The essays focus on such 
different areas and work from such varying assumptions that the 
reader does not come away with any coherent sense of the role of pre-
cedent in legal theory. Although all of the essays address some aspect 
of precedent, it is difficult to find a theme that unifies them. A sum-
mary of the three essays dealing with the theory of binding precedent 
will illustrate this point. 
In Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis (pp. 73-
87), Peter Wesley-Smith addresses whether strict stare decisis can be 
justified by either the declaratory or the positivist theory of decision-
making. The declaratory theory views the common law as independ-
ent of the pronouncements of the judges: it is "unchanging and 
unchangeable in essential content" (p. 79). Given that it is the judge's 
duty to rule according to this eternal law and that previous judges may 
have erred, precedents under the declaratory theory can never be 
1. Reader in the Department of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong. Among Goldstein's 
other works are Some Problems About Precedent, 43 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 88 (1984) and Four Al-
leged Paradoxes in Legal Reasoning, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313 (1979). 
2. As usually formulated, the notion of precedent is that like cases should be treated alike. 
3. The contributors are: Theodore M. Benditt, Professor of Philosophy and Dean of the 
School of Humanities at the University of Alabama at Birmingham; Anthony Blackshield, Pro-
fessor of Legal Studies at La Trobe University, Melbourne; Richard Bronaugh, Professor of Phi-
losophy at the University of Western Ontario; Jim Evans, Senior Lecturer in Law at Auckland 
University, New Zealand; Neil MacCormick, Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of 
Nature and Nations, and Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Edinburgh; Michael S. 
Moore, Robert Kingsley Professor of Law at the University of Southern California, and Profes-
sor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley; Gerald J. Postema, Associate Professor of 
Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and Peter Wesley-Smith, Profes-
sor of Law at the University of Hong Kong. Pp. ix-x. 
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strictly binding- they are good indicators of what the law is, but they 
are not the law and hence cannot command blind adherence. 4 The 
positivist theory, on the other hand, views judicial pronouncements as 
law made by judges. This would, at first, seem to require that judge-
made law be strictly followed; in fact, Wesley-Smith believes that the 
positivist theory can support vertical stare decisis. 5 But what about 
horizontal stare decisis? It would appear that if a court declares that 
stare decisis is a rule of law, then subsequently that court is explicitly 
bound to follow its own precedents (p. 85). However, Wesley-Smith 
argues that "a court's authority to make law must be a continuing 
authority, which would be denied if a court were bound by its own 
decisions" (p. 82). He finds horizontal stare decisis as untenable as the 
idea that Parliament could bind itself for the future. 6 To those who 
would argue that law can derive from a legal system's "rule of recogni-
tion,"7 Wesley-Smith responds that such a rule is nothing more than 
"the various criteria generally accepted as fundamental by the person-
nel of the legal system" (p. 86) and that the authority of stare decisis 
(like any rule of law) becomes uncertain when the personnel no longer 
agree that it is law. Thus, Wesley-Smith concludes, neither the posi-
tivist theory nor the declaratory theory can support the practice of 
stare decisis. 
Theodore M. Benditt, in The Rule of Precedent (pp. 89-106), exam-
ines the theoretical basis of precedent from a different angle, asking 
how a rule of stare decisis can logically arise in the first place. After 
first analyzing various justifications for stare decisis, 8 Benditt argues 
4. P. 79. In another part of the essay, Wesley-Smith gives what might seem to be a different 
account of the declaratory theory: "[T]he judge searches the records, discovers the law previ· 
ously recognized, declares and expounds it, and applies it to the dispute before him." P. 74. 
Although this statement suggests reliance on the rulings in previous cases rather than on the 
judge's own determination of the law, it assumes that the law is "recognized" (i.e., discovered) 
and not created. 
5. Vertical stare decisis refers to "a court being bound by decisions of courts above it in the 
hierarchy." P. 81. Horizontal stare decisis refers to a court being bound by its own earlier deci· 
sions. See p. 82. 
6. P. 82 n.46. But cf Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding 
Precedent, in OXFORD EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 148, 154 (A. Guest ed. 1961). 
7. P. 85; see, e.g., Simpson, supra note 6, at 154-55. 
8. Benditt examines four such arguments. The first is that logical consistency demands that 
later cases be treated like previous similar cases. Benditt dismisses this argument with the obser-
vation that logical consistency merely demands that a reason be given that justifies the change in 
treatment. Pp. 89-90. The second argument addressed is the familiar one that justice requires 
that like cases be treated alike. The problem with this argument, according to Bendit!, is that 
disparate treatment of similar cases means only that one of the parties is being treated unfairly -
the party whose case is decided wrongly, who can be the litigant in either the first or second case. 
P. 90. Third, following precedent promotes stability and certainty in the legal system. While 
acknowledging the value of stability, Benditt warns that "(t]he law cannot become entirely 
static"; flexibility is needed to meet inevitable social change. P. 91. The fourth argument for 
stare decisis applies when the prior decision was reached by "a more or less arbitrary drawing of 
lines for future reference." P. 92 (quoting Lyons, Formal Justice, Moral Commitment, and Judi· 
cial Precedent, 1984 J. PHIL. 580, 585). The argument for following precedent in such cases is 
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that a rule of precedent evolves just like ordinary substantive rules of 
law: through "repeated, reinforcing judicial decisions" establishing a 
rule of, in this case, following past decisions (p. 97). The argument, in 
detail, runs as follows: 
Suppose a rule of law favoring complainants in a given sort of case be-
comes established ... by a line of decisions in which each judge decides 
that the best reasons favor following the prior decisions [independent of 
the merits of each case]. Let us suppose further that in other sorts of 
cases judges have regularly followed prior decisions, and that as an up-
shot various rules of law have been established. An important by-prod-
uct of this process is that a legal rule of precedent is likely to become 
established in the same way. It is easy to imagine it becoming both the 
accepted and expected practice of and among judges to decide cases by 
appeal to past decisions. Judges come to regard the following of prior 
decisions as appropriate for themselves and for other judges, and to 
think it wrong - legally wrong - to do otherwise. . . . [W]hen this 
stage has been reached it is correct to say that a legal rule eX:ists. · [p. 97] 
More important than the possible criticisms of this argument9 is its 
strong positivist assumption: that judicial decisions, at least collec-
tively and over time, make law. It is on this positivist assumption that 
Benditt bases his theory of stare decisis. Yet Wesley-Smith argued in 
the previous essay that positivism fails to support stare decisis. 
Clearly, the authors' theses conflict - yet, because they pursue differ-
ent topics and because they fail to address directly each other's argu-
ments, the extent and seriousness of the conflict and whether and how 
the conflict can be reconciled is left unclear. 
The reader revisits horizontal stare decisis in Anthony Black-
shield's ''Practical Reason" and "Conventional Wisdom·~· The House 
of Lords and Precedent (pp. 107-54). Specifically, Blackshield exam-
ines how the House of Lords has historically dealt with its own prece-
dents and the theories, new and old, of how to justify these 
approaches. In the nineteenth-century case of London Street Tram-
ways, Ltd. v. London County Council, 10 the House of Lords declared 
itself absolutely bound by its own prior decisions. The House aban-
that "the original decision constitutes a commitment, made to others, that future decisions in 
similar cases shall be made similarly." Id. (emphasis in original). Benditt likes this approach 
and thinks an analogous situation appears in cases where the previous decision is not arbitrary, 
but where the disagreement in society is so sharp that it might seem arbitrary. As he puts it, "the 
less the agreement on principles [in society], the more like an arbitrary commitment a judicial 
decision will seem." P. 92. Benditt's support for following precedent thus seems to be based on 
societal skepticism, namely "our (collective, though not individual) lack of certainty about the 
correctness of certain of the social and political principles we adopt." P. 92. 
9. One difficulty is that it assumes (incorrectly) that judges can determine that the best rea-
sons favor following past decisions without knowing the alternative, le., the arguments that go to 
the merits of the case. Yet if judges do consider the arguments that go to the merits and reject 
them in favor of following the prior decisions, then they - to some extent - have decided on the 
merits. 
IO. 1898 App. Cas. 375. 
1708 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1705 
doned this approach in 1966 by declaring that, while normally it 
would follow precedents, it would "depart from a previous decision 
when it appeared right to do so."11 
One possible explanation for this history is that the House of 
Lord's approach to its own precedents is "not itself a subject-matter 
for precedent" (p. 110). By this view, the House's approach is consid-
ered a matter of "practice." Rules of practice are not the same as rules 
of law, though they can "harden into law and create new rules of law 
where no relevant rule existed before" (p. 110). In short, rules of prac-
tice appear to be law-like except that their application is, to some ex-
tent, subject to the discretion of judges. As Blackshield puts it, 
"however firmly a 'practice' may seem to have hardened into 'law,' it 
is always open to courts to affirm that it was after all only a 'practice,' 
and thus to change it in circumstances where they would not be will-
ing (or able) to change a rule of law" (p. 111; emphasis in original). 
However, as Blackshield points out, explaining the House's approach 
to precedent in this way does not fully account for the belief that pre-
vailed during the London Street Tramways regime that the rule against 
self-overruling was legally binding and thus not subject to judicial dis-
cretion. Blackshield also seems unconvinced by the notion of a court's 
"inherent" power to regulate its own practice, though he fails to ex-
plain the theoretical basis of his objection. 
Blackshield then considers explaining the House's approach to pre-
cedent in terms of a "constitutional convention." This differs from a 
"practice" in that a constitutional convention must 
have about it a quality of moral restraint, importing (i) that the effect of 
the convention must somehow be to limit the exercise of power, and (ii) 
that observance of the limits imposed must be perceived not merely in 
terms of practical convenience, nor even of rational "principle," but as 
some kind of moral obligation. 12 
Although it may be easy to see the London Street Tramways rule as an 
11. Lord Gardiner's announcement of the new practice reads: 
Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which 
to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some 
degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as 
a basis for orderly development of legal rules. 
Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to 
injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. 
They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former deci-
sions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears 
right to do so. 
In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the 
basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been entered 
into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law. 
This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in this 
House. 
Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234, 1234. 
12. P. 144 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). Just why a moral obligation cannot in-
volve a rational principle is not explained. 
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instrument of restraint, to view the Practice Statement rule that way 
requires a change in perspective. Instead of describing it as allowing 
departures from past precedent, Blackshield suggests that the Practice 
Statement is simply a less strict version of the London Street Tram-
ways rule: The House of Lords will use this newly proclaimed power 
to overrule sparingly so that the judiciary will not usurp too much the 
functions of the legislative branch of government. 13 The Practice 
Statement can thus be seen not as granting power to overrule, but as 
assuring that such power will be used within limits. As Blackshield 
observes, "[t]hese limits and assurances are precisely the stuff that 
constitutional convention is made of" (p. 144). 
Since Blackshield defines a "constitutional CQnvention" in terms of 
"moral restraint,"14 he must confront the fact that "[m]oral restraints 
on power-wielders are not intended for the benefit of other power-
wielders" (p. 146) but rather for the "public good."15 Here, Black-
shield is skeptical that either individual interests or the "public good" 
have ever been promoted by the House's strict adherence to precedent 
(p. 151). In the end, therefore, he views the attempt to conceptualize 
the House's approach to precedent as a "constitutional convention" as 
a theoretically unsound, though possibly convenient, "carpet" under 
which we can sweep our worries concerning its juristic status (pp. 153-
54). 
Like the previous two essays, Blackshield's is internally coherent. 
The problem lies in relating it to the other essays, both those dealing 
with the same general subject and the others in the book. As Benditt 
does in his essay, Blackshield implicitly accepts a positivist view of law 
in his discussions of "practice" and "convention."16 Blackshield, un-
like Benditt, does respond to Wesley-Smith's argument that a court 
cannot bind its successors,17 arguing that since it "depends on an in-
ference from the nature of sovereign legislative power, this attempt to 
extend it to judicial power is probably more 'ingenious than persua-
sive" (pp. 137-38; emphasis in original). Here, however, Blackshield 
misses Wesley-Smith's point: that when the House overrules previous 
decisions it is exercising legislative-like powers. Thus, his response is 
insufficient. On the other hand, though Blackshield and Benditt both 
13. See p. 144. 
14. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
15. P. 148. Blackshield recognizes the difficulty in determining just what the "public good" 
refers to, but suggests that rather than responsiveness to public opinion, "the aspects of 'public 
good' which have especial relevance and significance for judicial institutions may have to be 
found elsewhere, for instance in the need for protection of individual freedom." P. 149. 
16. For Benditt's support of positivism, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. Although 
neither a "practice" nor a "constitutional convention" is "law,'' they both share with the law the 
characteristic of being created by judges, as opposed to existing eternally as in the declaratory 
theory. Pp. 110, 139-40; see supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
17. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
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presuppose positivism, they do not even address the same issues. 
Hence, despite some tantalizing points at which the essays converge, 
these points are too few and not significant enough to add a unifying 
element to the essays. 
It is even more difficult to relate these essays to the others dealing 
with different general areas. For example, in Precedent, Induction, 
and Ethical Generalization (pp. 183-216), Michael S. Moore attempts 
to solve two problems of generalization he finds in law, science, and 
ethics. The first problem concerns how to justify going from particu-
lar bits of evidence (e.g., past decisions, scientific data, or specific ethi-
cal judgments) to general rules. Moore's solution is, in short, to deny 
any need to justify the principle of induction separately from the justi-
fication of the particular rules sought to be established (pp. 196-97). 
To those who would object that the particular inductive arguments for 
the particular rules ultimately rely on som"e other inductive argu-
ments, which in tum must rely on some other inductive arguments, 
and so forth, Moore responds that no starting point is necessary since 
new beliefs are justified according to their coherence with old beliefs 
(pp. 197-98). As for the second problem-which rule to generalize to 
when more than one fits the data - Moore argues that one should 
pick the rule that most coheres with other accepted beliefs (pp. 206-
09). 
How Moore's arguments affect the theories in the three essays de-
scribed above is not clear. What relation does Wesley-Smith's rejec-
tion of stare decisis have to the problem of induction? How does 
Moore's theory affect Blackshield's analysis, which assumes that 
"practice" and "convention" are both deliberately chosen and not 
"discovered" through a process of generalization? Moore and Benditt 
might seem to advocate similar theories18 yet, as it turns out, the simi-
larities are superficial. Benditt assumes that judges can generalize 
from past decisions to form a rule of precedent, while Moore's whole 
essay focuses on the very process of generalizing. So again, significant 
debate on any single issue fails to materialize, and the reader is left 
wondering why these essays are in the same; book. 
The essays in Precedent in Law deal with numerous aspects of pre-
cedent, but the diversity of these works makes it difficult to relate one 
piece to another. Thus it is unlikely that the scholar will find more 
than a few of the essays useful. However, despite the lack of coher-
ence among the contributions, Precedent in Law is still worth reading. 
The essays themselves are generally very good: well-organized, inter-
esting, and accessible to the general reader. While the works have a 
18. Both argue that what seems to be a special problem is not really so special. Moore claims 
that the process of induction needs no more justification than the particular rules sought to be 
established; Benditt argues that the rule of precedent does not need to be established any differ-
ently than typical substantive rules of law. 
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theoretical emphasis, they also provide appropriate support for their 
theories. Precedent in Law's value is as an introduction to some of the 
historical and contemporary thinking on precedent. 
- Erik G. Light 
